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CASE COMMENTS
KEPPLER V. HINSDALE TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 86
ENTERING THE POINT OF No RETURN
IN KEPPLER v. Hinsdale Township High School District 86,1
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Il-
linois denied the sexual harassment claim of a woman who had
entered into a consensual sexual relationship with her boss. The
court held that once the sexual relationship between the parties
had ended, the plaintiff was precluded from recovering under Title
VII for sexual harassment. The plaintiff, Rose Keppler, was em-
ployed by the school district as the Coordinator of Education Ser-
vices, an administrative position. A sexual relationship developed
between Keppler and Dr. Miller, who was the assistant principal
of one of the schools in the district. The relationship continued for
nearly four years, with Keppler receiving several promotions
throughout this time.2
Although their sexual relationship terminated in the spring of
1986, Miller and Keppler saw each other socially on three more
occasions. On the first occasion, in April, Keppler accompanied
Miller to his parents' house. After driving back to his house,
Miller invited Keppler inside. When she refused to accompany
him, he became angry, and insisted that their sexual relationship
should continue. After Keppler refused a second time, Miller
threw Keppler's car keys in her lap, and stormed inside.3
1. 715 F. Supp. 862 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
2. She was promoted to Director of Special Services in 1982. In 1986, her responsi-
bilities increased when she was promoted to Director of Curriculum, Instruction, Staff De-
velopment and Special Services. Id. at 864-65.
3. Id. at 865.
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The next incident occurred later that month when Miller in-
vited Keppler to join him for dinner with several other couples.
Keppler agreed. After dinner, Miller again suggested that they
return to his house for sex. Keppler refused again.4
In May, at the request of one of her friends, Keppler invited
Miller to accompany her to a dinner party thrown by Keppler's
friend. Miller agreed and attended the party with Keppler. This
was the last time the two of them went out socially.5
In August, Miller began making negative comments to Kep-
pler about her professional conduct. Eventually, Miller repeated
these criticisms to Keppler's superior, District Superintendent
John Thorson. With full knowledge of the turmoil between Kep-
pler and Miller, Thorson transferred Keppler's office to a different
school in the district, and suggested that she resign from her cur-
rent position as Director of Curriculum. School Board President
Richard Spiegel also advised Keppler to resign. Two months later,
the Board terminated Keppler's position, ostensibly for financial
reasons. She then was transferred to a position as a special educa-
tion teacher, with a reduction in salary.'
Keppler brought suit against both Miller and District 86 for
sexual harassment.7 The court held that Keppler was unable to
prove that she had been sexually discriminated against. Therefore,
the court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment,
and declined to consider whether the District was liable for
Miller's actions.'
The Keppler decision merits attention because of the court's
confused reasoning, questionable interpretation of precedent, and
bias against Keppler in the opinion. This Comment analyzes these
flaws and argues that the court should have found for Keppler.
I. HISTORY
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers
from discriminating against employees or potential employees on
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 865-66.
7. Keppler requested relief under: 1) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) for sexual discrimina-
tion by Miller in violation of her equal protection rights; 2) section 1983 against the Dis-
trict for denial of her due process rights when firing her; and 3) Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 against District 86 for sexual discrimination for relying upon Miller's
recommendation that she be terminated, Id. at 866.
8. Keppler, 715 F. Supp. at 866-70.
866 [Vol. 40:865
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the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin or color.9 Sexual
discrimination is also prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution.'0 Whether a claim is based on Ti-
tle VII or the fourteenth amendment, the plaintiff must prove he
or she was discriminated against on the basis of sex."'
An action for sexual harassment originates as a subset of sex-
ual discrimination.1 2 There are two types of sexual harassment.
The first, called hostile environment sexual harassment, occurs
when an employer subjects an employee to repeated sexual com-
ments, innuendos or touching. As long as the sexual harassment
alters the conditions of the employment and creates a hostile and
abusive working environment, the employer's actual motivation is
irrelevant.' Litigation usually occurs when an employee is repeat-
edly exposed to such harassment, rejects the employer's advances,
and then is either denied some type of promotion, demoted, or
fired.' However, sexual harassment also exists when an employee
succumbs to her employer's sexual advances out of fear of being
fired.' 5
The second type of sexual harassment is called quid pro quo
sexual harassment. This "occurs when an employer expressly or
impliedly makes sexual favors a condition for the employee to re-
ceive or retain job benefits, or deprives the employee of job bene-
fits on the basis of the employee's refusal to engage in sexual rela-
9. The relevant portion of the statute states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin ....
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-2(a)(1) (1982).
10. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; see, e.g., Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d
1180, 1185 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S, 228, 234-35 (1979)).
11. Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1433, 1436-37 (7th Cir. 1988) (equal protection
clause and Title VII do not require a plaintiff in a sexual harassment suit to show that
defendant discriminated against women as a class, but that defendant discriminated
against the plaintiff because of her membership in the class).
12. Thus, sexual harassment is one type of sexual discrimination. Keppler v. Hins-
dale Township High School Dist. 86, 715 F. Supp 862, 865 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (citing
Bertoncini v. Schrimpf, 712 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1989)).
13. Keppler, 715 F. Supp. at 866. Furthermore, a finding of sexual harassment re-
quires no evidence of economic harm to the plaintiff. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 67-68 (1986).
14. See, e.g., Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1988) (plaintiff denied promo-
tion and later sued employer and supervisor for sexual harassment).
15. This was the case in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
1989-90]
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tions."'1 In order to prevail in this type of action, an employee
must prove:
(1) that the employee was a member of a protected class;
(2) that the employee was subjected to unwelcomed sexual
harassment in the form of sexual advances or requests for sexual
favors;
(3) that the harassment complained of was based on sex;
(4) that the employee's submission to the unwelcomed ad-
vances was an express or implied condition for receiving job bene-
fits or that the employee's refusal to submit to a supervisor's sex-
ual demands resulted in a tangible job detriment; and
(5) the existence of respondeat superior liability. 17
In a quid pro quo action, one instance of discrimination is enough
to give rise to a claim of sexual harassment.'
Because courts have infrequently addressed cases where the
parties have previously been involved in a consensual romance,
they have been uncertain in their resolution of the situation. Kos-
ter v. Chase Manhattan Bank" involved a consensual affair be-
tween the employee and her supervisor. While the employee was
fired after the affair ended, the decision to fire her was not her
supervisor's, nor was there any evidence that the supervisor had
recommended that she be terminated.20 The court ruled there was
no quid pro quo sexual harassment because the employee did not
suffer any adverse consequences after the affair had ended; in
fact, she was promoted several times thereafter and received sal-
ary raises more frequently than when the affair was ongoing. 2'
Moreover, the court also ruled that there was no hostile environ-
ment harassment because the employee could not prove that her
supervisor had ever harassed her or that her participation in the
affair was involuntary.22
Another consensual relationship that turned sour was liti-
gated in Huebschen v. Department of Health and Social Ser-
vices.23 David Huebschen had received a one-year probationary
16. Keppler, 715 F. Supp. at 866 (citing Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Management
Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1986)).
17. Highlander, 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 1986).
18. Keppler, 715 F. Supp. at 867.
19. 687 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
20. Id. at 861-62.
21. Id. at 861.
22. Id. at 862-63.
23. 716 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1983).
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promotion to a supervisory position, under the supervision of the
defendant Jacquelyn Rader."' After the two had engaged in a
"one-night stand," the relationship became strained. After Rader
began making sexually insulting remarks about Huebschen,
Huebschen told her he merely wanted them to be friends. Rader
later told him there were problems with his job performance, and
the probationary period was terminated at her request.2 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
in reversing the district court's verdict, held that this did not con-
stitute sexual discrimination.26 In order to prevail on such a claim,
the plaintiff must show that he was intentionally discriminated
against because of his membership in a particular class.2 7 For in-
stance, a man commits sex discrimination when he refuses to hire
any women. However, it is not sex discrimination if a person is
treated unfairly merely as an individual. An employer must act
"at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group." '28
This was not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause be-
cause Rader did not intentionally discriminate against Huebschen
because he belonged to the "class of men." There was also no evi-
dence that Rader attempted to discriminate against other men in
the workplace. Rather, Huebschen's treatment stemmed from his
former relationship with Rader, of which his gender was merely
coincidental.29 "Thus the proper classification . . . was the group
of persons with whom Rader had or sought to have a romantic
affair. . . . As unfair as Rader's treatment of Huebschen may
have been, we simply are not persuaded that the Equal Protection
Clause should protect such a class."30 Against this background,
Keppler was decided.
II. Keppler v. Hinsdale Township High School District 86
In a memorandum opinion, United States District Judge
24. Id. at 1168.
25. Id. at 1169. Other evidence of harassment included the testimony of the plaintiff
that Rader called him and threatened that he would lose all of his friends and be exposed
as a chronic liar if he ever mentioned the real reason for his demotion. Id.
26. Id. at 1171.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1171 (quoting Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979)
(footnote omitted)) (emphasis omitted).
29. Id. at 1172.
30. Id.
8691989-90]
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Brian Barnett Duff ruled that Keppler failed to prove any evi-
dence of quid pro quo sexual harassment, and granted summary
judgment for Miller.31 After an interesting narrative of the facts,
the court began examining the merits of Keppler's three causes of
action 32 by explaining the distinction between quid pro quo and
hostile environment sexual harassment.:3 Judge Duff noted that
Keppler did not specify which type of harassment she was alleg-
ing. He determined that quid pro quo sexual harassment was in-
tended by Keppler's allegations that Miller had embarked on a
campaign to have Keppler removed from her position once she be-
gan rejecting his requests for sex. Consequently, Keppler was pre-
cluded from claiming hostile environment sexual harassment.
Next, the court held that in light of Huebschen, Keppler's
quid pro quo argument could not prevail. The court interpreted
Huebschen as applying only to quid pro quo cases.3" It reasoned
that employees who had entered into consensual relationship with
their employers are estopped from asserting any type of quid pro
quo claim. "[O]nce a person engages in consensual sex with an
employer, the employee may not thereafter complain if the em-
ployer threatens termination as a penalty for ending the relation-
ship." 35 However, hostile environment claims were still available
to employees who had had consensual relationships with their em-
ployers after Huebschen.3 6
The court then interpreted Huebschen as distinguishing be-
tween standard quid pro quo cases and retaliatory quid pro quo
cases. Standard quid pro quo occurs when an employer expressly
or impliedly conditions job benefits on the receipt of sexual favors,
i.e., "You have sex with me and you will get a raise . . . .,3 On
the other hand, retaliatory quid pro quo occurs when an employer
makes sexual advances without expressing or implying that job
benefits are contingent upon complying. After rejection by the em-
ployee, the employer either fires or demotes the employee, or
makes life miserable for the employee in retaliation for rejecting
31. Keppler v. Hinsdale Township High School Dist. 86, 715 F. Supp. 862, 872
(N.D. Ill. 1989).
32. See supra note 7.
33. See Keppler, 715 F. Supp. at 866-67.
34. Id. at 868.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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the advances."8
When a consensual relationship does not exist, courts do not
distinguish between types of quid pro quo cases as both amount to
sexual discrimination. However, the court stated that the distinc-
tion is vital when there has been a prior consensual relationship. 9
If the employer threatens reprisals should the sexual relationship
not continue (i.e., standard quid pro quo), then the employer is
using gender as a basis for acting. When the employer makes no
threats in an effort to maintain the relationship, but only harasses
the employee after termination of the relationship (i.e., retaliatory
quid pro quo), the employer is not acting on the basis of gender
but rather, on the basis of a failed interpersonal relationship.
An employee who chooses to become involved in an inti-
mate affair with her employer . . . removes an element of
her employment relationship from the workplace, and in
the realm of private affairs people do have the right to re-
act to rejection, jealousy and other emotions which Title
VII says have no place in the employment setting.41
Therefore, retaliatory claims create a presumption that no sexual
harassment occurred. The presumption is only rebuttable by proof
that the employer demanded further sexual relations before acting
as he did.4
Thus, Judge Duff reasoned that the existence of sexual dis-
crimination ultimately depended upon the employer's motivations
for acting. An employer who treats unfairly an employee who has
rejected the employer's advances, has committed sexual harass-
ment because it is wrong for the employer to feel differently about
the employee because of the rejection.4 3 But Huebschen taught
that an employer who reacted because of a failed interpersonal
relationship had every right to feel differently about the employee,
and that this was not sexual harassment. Although Miller bore a
grudge and "then embarked on a campaign to denigrate [Keppler]
in the eyes of Superintendent Thorson, with the ultimate goal of
having her removed from her administrative position, 44 this was
not actionable under Huebschen. The only way Keppler could
38. Id.
39. Id. at 868.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 869.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 869 n.4.
44. Id. at 869.
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have prevailed was if she could have shown that Miller had
threatened the denial of some benefit if the relationship did not
continue (i.e. standard quid pro quo). Since Keppler could not
show that Miller made any threats, her sexual discrimination
claim failed.45
III. ANALYSIS
The Keppler case gives new meaning to the term sexual har-
assment. It forges a standard in which quid pro quo sexual har-
assment cannot occur in consensual relationship cases unless the
plaintiff can prove that the employer had threatened a denial of
benefits if the relationship did not continue. However, the court's
interpretation of prevailing case law, and its ruling in Keppler, is
an example of skewed reasoning.
First, the court gave much more meaning to Huebschen than
seems to have been intended. Huebschen did not distinguish be-
tween quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment.
Thus, Judge Duff's interpreting Huebschen to allow claims for
hostile environment sexual harassment when a prior consensual
relationship existed, but not to allow a quid pro quo claim is
questionable.
Furthermore, the court's distinction between standard and re-
taliatory quid pro quo is troubling. Keppler seems to suggest that
retaliatory quid pro quo is not considered to be harassment when
there has been a prior consensual relationship. On the other hand,
a standard quid pro quo claim was unavailable because implicit in
the definition of standard quid pro quo is the idea that some type
of threat had been made. Because no threat had been made and a
prior consensual relationship existed, Judge Duff's interpretation
of Huebschen foreclosed Keppler's claim.
Second, the court's reliance on Huebschen is unfounded be-
cause Keppler is factually distinguishable from Huebschen. It is
true that no sexual harassment was found in the Huebschen case.
In Huebschen the parties had a one-night stand, with no subse-
quent sexual requests by the employer, and thereafter the em-
ployee was fired.46 In Keppler, although the four year affair had
45. Id. at 869-70. Regarding the other causes of action, Miller's request for sanctions
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 was denied, and the court held that Kep-
pier's due process rights were not violated since she did not have an entitlement to her
administrative position. Id. at 870-72.
46. Huebschen v. Department of Health and Social Servs., 716 F.2d 1167, 1169 (7th
[Vol. 40:865
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ended, Miller requested sex from Keppler on two occasions. When
she rejected his requests, Miller made a number of negative com-
ments about her work to her supervisor.4 Thus, it can be argued
that this was sexual harassment because once the relationship en-
ded, Miller's actions implied that if Keppler did not resume the
relationship, there would be negative results. This was especially
true since he contacted her more than once, and initially made the
remarks to Keppler instead of to Superintendent Thorson. How-
ever, with Huebschen, a one-night stand arguably did not consti-
tute a relationship, and further, there was not enough evidence to
determine that the employee was actually demoted in retaliation
for rejecting the employer. 8
Third, although Huebschen is binding, it is poorly decided. It
is questionable why the existence of a prior consensual relation-
ship should negate any later claim of sexual harassment. If the
employee has ended the relationship, then any further advances by
the employer are unwanted. If the employer then exerts his or her
power to obtain sexual favors, or deprives the employee of poten-
tial benefits because the employee refuses the requests, then the
employer is harassing the employee. Contrary to Huebschen, the
employer should not be able to harass the employee, or use her
power against the employee, simply because of a prior consensual
relationship. The result is the same; the employer is punishing the
employee for foregoing a sexual relationship with her.
Finally, Judge Duffs apparent bias against Keppler warrants
some consideration. His attitude towards Keppler was first notice-
able in his opening statement: "[Keppler] alleges sexual discrimi-
nation and due process violations, but what she really wants is to
make others pay for her mistakes. She will not succeed here."4
This attitude continues throughout the opinion. "In the fall of
1982, [Miller's] marriage was in trouble and he was seeking com-
panionship and advice. Ms. Keppler provided them. ' 50 Judge Duff
also attempted to give Miller the benefit of the doubt in some situ-
ations. After stating that Keppler might prevail if she could
demonstrate Miller threatened her should the relationship not
Cir. 1983).
47. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4 & 6.
48. Huebschen, 716 F.2d at 1169.
49. Keppler v. Hinsdale Township High School Dist. 86, 715 F.2d 862, 864 (N.D.
Ill. 1989).
50. Id.
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continue, a footnote was inserted stating that had Keppler done
so, "[Miller] still could have argued that it was her rejection of
him, not her rejection of sex, that motivated his subsequent ac-
tions."'" Even after denying Miller's request for Rule 11 sanctions
against Keppler, Judge Duff remarked:
Dr. Miller is understandably upset by Ms. Keppler's plead-
ings. An allegation of sexual retaliation is bad enough; when
compounded with a claim that he was sexually abusing a woman
in the workplace, it could prove devastating to a man who works
closely with women every day, some only of high school age.
... Thus, while Ms. Keppler and her attorneys will have to
live with pleading this case as something it is not, they do not
have to pay sanctions for doing so.52
Comments like these by Judge Duff were not only extremely
unnecessary, but they were unprofessional. While Judge Duff was
very careful to convey his feelings towards Keppler, he completely
failed to take into account the fact that the relationship could
have been as much Miller's mistake as Keppler's. Judge Duff's
confused analysis of the law began to make sense once one consid-
ered his hostile attitude towards Keppler.
CONCLUSION
In sum, the Keppler decision was wrongly decided. The court
read too much into the Huebschen decision, and its reliance on
that case was misplaced. The existence of a prior consensual rela-
tionship should not make a difference in sexual harassment claims.
Perhaps Judge Duff felt that he justified the result, but the opin-
ion makes little sense, and all Judge Duff succeeded in doing was
to embarrass Keppler. In the end, Keppler's claim for sexual har-
assment should have prevailed.
PAMELA S. NAGY
51. Id. at 869-70 n.6.
52. Id. at 870.
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